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1. Introduction
This thematic issue of The African Journal of Information and Communication (AJIC 
Issue 17) brings together scholarly contributions on a range of topics relating to access 
to telecommunications, the regulation of telecommunications and the development 
of digital financial services. It includes a particular focus on the development of 
mobile money in Southern and East Africa. East Africa has led in the adoption 
of mobile money transfer services, where mobile network operators enable the 
transfer of funds between individuals. The services have extended to merchant 
payments and bill payments, such as for utilities. More recently, since around 2013, 
arrangements have enabled mobile banking to take off in some countries, as part of 
the broader range of digital financial services. This raises questions about the extent 
of access and service provision. While the range of services can provide enormous 
opportunities to communities for economic activity and market linkages, as well as to 
facilitate the delivery of health and education services, this depends on whether the 
telecommunications infrastructure is in place, whether fixed or mobile. 
The policy and regulatory issues cut across telecommunications and finance, meaning 
that they straddle the areas of responsibility of different regulators and government 
departments. There are also questions of consumer protection and competition. 
Building a common understanding of the issues is an important process in grappling 
with the regulatory challenges, especially given the complex and dynamic nature of 
these markets. 
2. Market structure, competition dynamics and pricing
In this thematic issue, Robb and Vilakazi compare developments in three countries 
where mobile money transfer has taken off, namely Kenya, Tanzania and Zimbabwe. 
The comparison of the market structure, competition dynamics and pricing in 
mobile payments markets in the three African countries shows that where there 
is a dominant incumbent, as in Kenya and Zimbabwe, tariffs for mobile payments 
tend to be higher and there is a wider gap between the charges for registered and 
unregistered customers. This is consistent with the predictions of economic theory 
in network industries and the incentives of incumbent operators to capture or tip 
the market in their favour. By attracting customers to the dominant network and 
making switching unattractive, the pricing bolsters the incumbent’s market power. 
All three countries have competition authorities and action has been taken by the 
authorities in Zimbabwe and Kenya. Tanzania, by comparison, has seen the Central 
Bank nurturing the development of the services using a soft touch and moral suasion, 
backed by its considerable powers. The competition issues have been minimised 
by the regulatory actions, which have ensured that three vigorous rivals have been 
maintained in the market and no one company has unilateral market power.  
3. Regulatory issues in mobile financial services
Two articles, one by Mazer and Rowan and the other by Blechman, narrow in on 
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Kenya and Tanzania and offer comparative insights. Mazer and Rowan consider the 
access channel for mobile financial services, transparency in the pricing and terms 
of the services, interoperability and the sharing of credit data. Blechman undertakes 
an in-depth analysis of the specific challenges of mobile credit. Mazer and Rowan 
find that channel access through unstructured supplementary service data (USSD) 
is especially important for competitive rivalry in mobile financial services. By using 
USSD, a range of providers can offer services over mobile channels. However, the 
mobile network operators (MNOs) control USSD. With rivalry between the MNOs, 
they are incentivised to offer reasonable terms to attract customers, as in Tanzania. 
With unilateral market power on the part of one provider, as in Kenya, then USSD 
access can be charged at high prices and those offering services, which do or may 
compete with the MNOs mobile financial services offering, can effectively be blocked. 
Enforcement action, whether by the competition authority or the regulator, is likely 
to be required. There are similar issues relating to transparency. Mazer and Rowan 
find that a lack of transparency hinders competition, through increasing search costs 
and making comparability more difficult. This warrants action under the consumer 
protection provisions of national laws and regulation. 
Interoperability is a crucial step in smaller competitors being able to attract subscribers, 
as these subscribers are then able to link with subscribers on the larger networks. 
However, starting with interoperability from the outset reduces the incentives for the 
first mover to invest in the network, as followers will be able to access the network 
without making their own investments. As the networks mature, the market power of 
the dominant network becomes an important concern and interoperability needs to 
be achieved. Mazer and Rowan describe how Tanzania has achieved interoperability 
through negotiations between the main providers, under the guidance of the Central 
Bank. Tanzania also issued guidance against agents being signed up on an exclusive 
basis. In each of these areas, Tanzania differs from Kenya and provides an important 
example for other countries. In Kenya, agent exclusivity was only achieved as a result 
of a settlement with the Competition Authority of Kenya.  
Of course, interoperability, or interconnection, when we consider telecommunications 
networks, needs to pay attention to off-net or call termination charges. Substantial 
charges mean there is a differential charged for calling or transferring to someone on 
another network and can mean that, while there may be technical interoperability, 
the penalty on consumers is such that it changes their behaviour in practice. The 
thematic report by Hawthorne analyses the effects of the decision to reduce mobile 
call termination rates (MTRs) in South Africa. While the incumbents had claimed 
little would result from the change in MTRs, the outcome was very substantial, since 
the more effective rivalry from the smaller networks, as a result of lower MTRs, forced 
the two large MNOs to compete, through lowering headline call charges (especially 
on pre-paid calls) to the advantage of consumers. Thus, regulation is important to 
support competitive rivalry.
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Blechman undertakes an in-depth analysis of the specific challenges of mobile 
credit in Kenya and Tanzania, where mobile money transfer services are ubiquitous. 
Mobile credit allows consumers to apply for loans over mobile devices and enables 
the extension of financial services to otherwise unbanked populations, such as small-
holder farmers and informal traders. As mobile credit grows it raises a number of 
regulatory challenges, especially as it cuts across different regulatory frameworks. 
Blechman identifies challenges in prudential regulation of the financial system, 
economic regulation to address market failures and consumer protection regulation to 
ensure consumers are informed, especially with a view to the potential for vulnerable 
consumers to rack up debt. 
4. Further considerations in formulating policy and regulation
It is important that policymakers and regulators ensure an enabling environment that 
incentivises innovation and investments in these new products and the underlying 
technologies that drive them. A critical consideration in the mobile credit offering 
is ability to evaluate risk. Blechman considers the importance of information from 
money transfers as an important source of data on subscribers’ behaviour, which can 
be used in credit extension, as it enables an individual’s track record to be built up 
from mobile credit data. However, the credit record is controlled by the mobile money 
service provider. As of 2016, there is a regulatory patchwork in Kenya and Tanzania, 
with many gaps with respect to this data. In particular, according to Blechman, mobile 
credit data needs to be included in credit reporting systems, in a way which furthers 
the policy goals, without exploding the costs of mobile credit or unfairly punishing 
the financially uneducated for mistakes.
The article on Uganda, by Macmillan, Paelo and Paremoer, complements the studies 
on Tanzania and Kenya, by considering the development in a country, which is 
rapidly catching up with its neighbours in adoption of mobile money. Macmillan 
et al. assess the effect of “light touch” regulation on the competitive dynamics of 
Uganda and contrast this with the experience in Tanzania, where regulation evolved 
from light touch regulation to a fuller framework as the sector grew. In Uganda, 
one firm has established a substantial lead position in mobile money and Uganda 
is certainly an example of mobile money take-off under an MNO led model. Light 
touch regulation incentivised the rapid expansion in services by the lead firm, as it 
could reap the rewards of its investments, with its market power practically unchecked. 
However, the dominant player in such a situation has the incentive to foreclose any 
rivals and maintain relatively high prices, both of which actions can stifle the growth 
of the services. Macmillan et al. identify a number of potential competition issues, 
which require attention. While Uganda has not had a competition authority, the 
Communications Act gives the Uganda Communications Commission the authority 
to regulate an extensive range of competition issues in the telecommunication sector. 
The Central Bank also issued non-binding mobile money guidelines in 2013. 
In addition, under private litigation, the dominant firm has been found to have 
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unlawfully blocked a smaller rival, although as at December 2016 this was still under 
appeal.
The Uganda case thus provides a good example of the regulatory challenges and of 
the benefits from mobile money. The recent proliferation of mobile financial services 
in developing countries has increased access to financial services among underserved 
rural and low-income populations. While these new services have the potential to 
further promote financial inclusion, they also raise novel regulatory issues and do 
not fit neatly into pre-existing regulatory categories. This is due to the novel nature 
of mobile credit and the variety of entities and regulatory frameworks implicated in 
the business models found in these two markets. Policymakers and regulators will 
need to make choices about how to regulate mobile credit, with respect to consumer 
protection, credit reporting and the availability of mobile and mobile money services 
transactional data, a key input for credit evaluation decisions. These choices will need 
to take into account promotion of financial inclusion and protection of consumers, 
without creating disincentives for innovation and investment.
By comparison with the three East African countries, South Africa has not seen 
mobile money take off, and financial services, such as credit, remain dominated by 
traditional banks. Makhaya and Nhundu consider the barriers to entry in banking 
through the eyes of a successful entrant in South Africa, Capitec Bank. The 
experience highlights the range of obstacles to effective rivalry. These obstacles range 
from the considerable time required to build the customer base, brand awareness, 
a branch network (in the absence of mobile money and branchless banking) to 
regulatory hurdles. The article also highlights the benefits of entry and the resultant 
competition in the retail banking sector, which had been dominated by four major 
retail banks. Significantly lower bank charges resulted, and Capitec’s entry sparked 
competition in low cost bank accounts and facilitated better services for low-income 
clients and enhanced financial inclusion. Makhaya and Nhundu identify a number 
of aspects that can still be improved in the regulatory framework, such as to facilitate 
switching and to support innovation, while, of course, effective bank supervision is 
essential for prudential reasons. 
The contribution by Bello, Opadiji, Faruk and Adediran highlights the challenges 
and opportunities on the ground for rural and remote communities in Nigeria. Their 
survey of 15 rural communities emphasises the importance of improving access. 
Four of the communities have no access to telecommunications services, while the 
remaining 11 have access, but it is relatively poor in terms of the quality of reception. 
Bello et al. highlight the substantial benefits, which would be realised from improved 
access, drawing from literature and the survey of the 15 communities. The benefits 
include farmers having better information about markets and being able to link 
with customers, as the Agric Mobile Phone Xchange in Nigeria is doing. There are 
also future benefits in education and community healthcare service delivery, where 
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rural healthcare centres can be linked to central facilities to obtain information and 
primary healthcare support, and provide data to monitor disease incidence. The 
survey identified perceptions of where improved telecommunications services would 
bring benefits with relationships with friends, family support networks and better 
neighbourhood security topping the list. This was followed by better education 
opportunities and health. Interestingly household income, business opportunities 
and the quality of government services were rated much lower.  
The differing approaches to telecommunications policy and regulation are starkly 
illustrated by Sutherland’s comparison of the Washington consensus policies of 
privatisation and liberalisation promoted in Africa, against the alternative approach 
of China.  African countries largely have tight private oligopolies or a single dominant 
firm. By comparison, China has maintained state-ownership in telecommunications, 
while encouraging competition amongst a number of market participants. Sutherland 
notes that China is becoming more engaged in African countries, through supporting 
network upgrading and other operations. This raises the question whether African 
countries can and should “look east”  for different models of telecommunications 
policy and regulation, as well as support for infrastructure investment.
